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Aquamar v. Del Monte Fresh Produce: Expanding the
Scope of Ambassadors' Rights Under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act

I. Introduction
In 1974, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)' was
enacted so that U.S. citizens could seek legal redress against
foreign states in certain circumstances.! In particular, the FSIA
provides that where a foreign government (or governmental entity)
is involved in legal proceedings and expressly waives its sovereign
immunity, U.S. courts may thereafter exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over that foreign government.'
However, the
legislative history of the FSIA has remained noticeably silent as to
who has authority to waive sovereign immunity before U.S. courts
and as to which particular body of law-state, federal,
international, or foreign-governs the matter.4 The Eleventh
Circuit gave extensive treatment to these issues in Aquamar S.A. v.
Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A.5 In reversing the federal district
court, the Eleventh Circuit applied federal and international law to
hold that, under the FSIA, an ambassador has the authority to
waive expressly his or her sovereign's immunity, "absent6
compelling evidence making it 'obvious' that he or she does not.",
Part II of this Note outlines the facts, case history, and
conclusions of both the federal district court and the federal court
1 28 U.S.C. § 1605
2

(1999).
See Jurisdictionof U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States, 1976: Hearings

on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94' Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1976) (statement of Monroe
Leigh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State).
I § 1605(a)(1).
4 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 18 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6617.
5 179 F.3d 1279 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
6 Id. at 1299.
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of appeals regarding an ambassador's power to effectuate an
express waiver of sovereign immunity under the FSIA.7 Part III of
this Note illustrates the relevant historical evolution of sovereign
immunity doctrine in the United States, emphasizing the waiver
provision of the FSIA.' Part IV of this Note reviews the
reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit and examines the possible
sociopolitical ramifications of the court's decision. 9 Finally, this
Note attempts to reconcile the consequences and policy concerns
of the Aquamar decision.'0
II. Statement of the Case
A. The Facts and ProceduralHistory
In 1995 the plaintiffs, commercial shrimp farmers in Ecuador,
commenced a series of actions in Florida state court against Del
Monte Fresh Produce Company and others."
The plaintiffs
alleged that fungicides and herbicides, produced or supplied by the
defendants, and used on Ecuadoran banana farms, had killed their
shrimp. 2 In response, the defendants filed third-, fourth-, and
fifth-party complaints against Programa Nacional de Banano
(PNB), an agency within the Ecuadoran Ministry of Agriculture
and Livestock. 3 After removing the cases to federal court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), 14 PNB joined in defendants'
motion to dismiss the actions on the grounds of forum non
conveniens. 5
The plaintiffs moved to strike the complaints against PNB
urging that the district court had no jurisdiction over PNB because,
as an agency of the Republic of Ecuador, it was immune from suit

I

See infra notes 11-54 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 55-107 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 108-46 and accompanying text.
1o See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
11 See Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1282.
12 See id.
See id.
14 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1999). Federal subject matter jurisdiction was based solely
on PNB's presence under 28 U.S.C § 1330(a) (1999), which grants federal courts
jurisdiction over foreign states and their relevant agencies. See id
13

15 See Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1282.
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under the FSIA. 6 Thereafter, PNB made numerous attempts to
waive its immunity so that the case would remain in federal
court. 7 When PNB's legal counsel failed to accomplish this with
a written waiver of immunity filed on behalf of their clients, PNB
offered the affidavit of Edgar Teran, Ecuador's ambassador to the
United States, which purported to do the same." Plaintiffs in turn
questioned whether the Ambassador had the authority to waive
PNB's sovereign immunity. 9 The district judge requested that the
parties supplement the record so that he could "become informed
of the relevant provisions of Ecuadoran law, determine precisely
what is required for an effective waiver of sovereign immunity
under that law, and examine the record to determine if there has
been an effective waiver."20 In addition to the opinion of an
Ecuadoran legal expert, PNB submitted the affidavit of Sixto
Duran Ballen, President of the Republic of Ecuador, which ratified
16

See id (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1999)). The Court of Appeals noted:

[A] typical sovereign immunity inquiry pits a defendant attempting to claim
immunity against a plaintiff who argues that an exception to immunity applies.
This case presented the district court with more unusual circumstances: the
plaintiffs claimed that sovereign immunity existed, while representatives of the
foreign sovereign defendant, PNB, claimed that it did not.
Id.
17 See id.
at 1283.

1 The affidavit stated in part:
I [Teran] respectfully waive PNB's sovereign immunity on behalf of PNB and
the Government of Ecuador on the following limited basis. Without waiving
any other defense of law or fact to the claims asserted against it in this litigation,
PNB hereby and for the purposes of these litigations only and in connection
with the pending forum non conveniens motions (1) explicitly waives its
immunity from the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(i)
and consents to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by this Court over PNB.
Id,at 1283. Teran further stated that the purpose of the waiver was to secure a forum
non conveniens dismissal in federal court:
The decision by the Ecuadoran government to submit to the court's jurisdiction
in connection with these cases was not made lightly but is a recognition of the
fundamental seriousness with which the Ecuadoran Government defends its
sovereignty over its environment and use of natural resources... according to
Ecuadoran law, conditions relating to the environment . . . belong to the
sovereignty of each state.

Id.
'9 See id. at 1283.
20

Id. at 1283-84.
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the statements made in Teran's affidavit.
Plaintiffs countered
with the affidavits of Ecuadoran legal experts and government
officials arguing that (1) the Attorney General of Ecuador was
granted the sole authority to act in judicial matters; (2) the
Ecuadoran Constitution forbade the waiving of Ecuador's
sovereign immunity; and (3) Ambassador Teran had ulterior
motives for waiving PNB's sovereign immunity.
The district court determined that PNB had failed to effectuate
a proper waiver of its sovereign immunity and dismissed the
complaints against PNB. 23 The court reasoned that Ambassador
Teran's affidavit was "expressly limited to the litigation of the
forum non conveniens motion now pending" and President
Ballen's affidavit was "similarly qualified. 2 4 Accordingly, the
court held that "no representative of the Republic of Ecuador ha[d]
ever purported to waive the immunity of the Republic with respect
to the third, fourth, and fifth party claims against PNB.,, 25 Because
PNB was no longer a party to the action, the district court was
without subject matter
26 jurisdiction and it therefore remanded the
cases to state court.
Upon return to the Florida state court, the defendants-this
time without PNB-again moved for a forum non conveniens
dismissal that was denied by the trial court.27 In 1997 the Florida
Court of Appeals reversed the decision, ruling that the Ecuadoran
courts were an appropriate alternative forum, and directed the trial
court to dismiss the cases on the grounds of forum non
conveniens. Thereafter, the Ecuadoran courts refused to accept
jurisdiction over the cases and the Florida
trial court intimated that
it might consider reinstating them.29 The defendants/appellants
21

See id at 1284. President Ballen's affidavit stated in part: "I ...

know what

Ambassador Teran has already stated, and I ratifly] his statement as the priority policy of
the Republic of Ecuador is that these matters.., should be decided within the Ecuadoran
forum." Id
22 See id.
23 See id
24

Id; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.

25

Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1284.

26

See id.

27

See id

28

See id

29

See id. at 1285.
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petitioned the Eleventh Circuit to reverse the federal district
court's dismissal of the claims against PNB and to return the cases
to federal court. 0
B. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
After determining that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal,3'
the Eleventh Circuit conducted a de novo review of the district
court's decision to dismiss the claims against PNB for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction." The court noted that PNB, as an
agency of the Republic of Ecuador, would be treated as a foreign
state for the purposes of the FSIA and as such was "immune from
the jurisdiction of the United States unless an FSIA statutory
exemption [was] applicable."33 The court determined that, on
appeal, the only relevant exception to the FSIA was the express
waiver of immunity provision under § 1605(a)(1) of the Act.3 4 The
Court of Appeals then turned to Ambassador Teran's affidavit and
the documents filed by PNB's legal counsel to determine if any of
those items constituted an express waiver of immunity.3"
30 See id. In all likelihood, the defendants, Del Monte and others believed that if

the Florida trial court were to handle their case again, they would be held liable. Thus,
the defendants perhaps wanted to bring PNB back into the case at the federal court level
so that at least some of that possible liability could be shared with PNB.
31 See id
32 See id at 1289. Note that "the existence of subject matter jurisdiction under the
FSIA is a question of law subject to de novo review." Export Group v. Reef Indus., Inc.,
54 F.3d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1995).
33 Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Honduras Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Gov't
of Honduras, 129 F.3d 543, 546 (11 th Cir. 1997)).
34 See id Section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA provides that
[A] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case in which the foreign state has waived
its immunity either explicitly [emphasis added] or by implication,
notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may
purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver[.
Id The court determined that PNB had not waived its immunity by implication
because "PNB never filed a responsive pleading, and its other participation in the
litigation, such as removing the cases to federal court, filing statements of position, and
joining the forum non conveniens motion, did not constitute an implicit waiver." Id
The court also dismissed application of the "commercial activity" exception set forth in
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) because the defendants/appellants did not claim that exception as
applicable to their case. See id.
35 See id. at 1291.
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As to the statements of PNB's lawyers, the court rejected
plaintiffs' argument that a document signed only by a private
attorney is never sufficient to waive the immunity of that
attorney's sovereign client.36 The court cited congressional intent
and several cases to support its conclusion that a private attorney
may expressly waive the sovereign immunity of his or her client. 7
Yet, because the statements in this case were not "clear, complete,
unambiguous, and unmistakable" manifestations of PNB's intent
to waive its immunity,38 the court held that the statements did not
expressly waive immunity.39 As to Ambassador Teran's affidavit,
the court decided that the affidavit's language was "sufficiently
complete" to effect a waiver of PNB's sovereign immunity. 0 The
court reasoned that the word "only" in the phrase "for the purposes
of these litigations only and in connection with the pending forum
non conveniens motions," modified "these litigations" but did not
modify "in connection with the ...motions."' Therefore, the
court held that Teran had not only limited his waiver to the forum
non conveniens motions but had also waived PNB's immunity in
regards to the third, fourth, and fifth party claims against them.42
The Eleventh Circuit next addressed the district court's
36

See id.

37 See id Because Congress had deemed a responsive pleading which failed to
raise the FSIA defense an implicit waiver (when filed by a private attorney representing
a foreign state), the Eleventh Circuit assumed that Congress intended that the same
attorney could use an express waiver to reach the same result. See id (citing Hercaire
Int'l, Inc. v. Argentina, 821 F.2d 559, 561, 563 (11th Cir. 1987)).
38 Id. at 1292 (quoting Aquinda v. Texaco, 175 F.R.D. 50, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
39 See id. at 1292. "Read literally, [counsel's statement] does not purport to waive
Ecuador's immunity, but merely states the PNB lawyers' opinion that Ecuador either had
filed an explicit waiver of immunity or planned to file one at some point. An express
waiver must be more exact than this." Id.
40 Id.

11Id. at 1293 (emphasis added).
42 See idaThe court pointed to Teran's second and final affidavit that stated Teran

intended his first affidavit "to waive the immunity of the Republic with respect to third,
fourth, and fifth party claims against PNB" as confirmation of their conclusion. Id In
ruling on this particular issue, the court noted that "nothing in the FSIA prohibits a
foreign sovereign from effecting a waiver of immunity for strategic purposes." Id The
court added that it "need not approve the reasons underlying a foreign state's waiver of
its immunity; indeed, to second-guess motivations and litigation strategy might signal a
disrespect for a sovereign's autonomy that is at odds with the policies underlying the
FSIA." Id.
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contention that Ecuadoran law should dictate who and what is
required for the issuance of an effective waiver of Ecuador's
immunity. Because the FSIA and its legislative history are silent
on whether federal or state law resolves the issue, the court relied
on congressional policy, related case law, and its own
interpretation of the FSIA. 4' The court concluded that when "a
duly accredited head of a diplomatic mission-such as an
ambassador-files a waiver of his or her sovereign's immunity in
a judicial proceeding, the court should assume that the sovereign
has authorized the waiver absent extraordinary circumstances."44
The court supported its conclusion by turning to relevant
principles of international law. 45 Relying again on a number of
sources, including the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations,46 the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States, 7 and the International Court of Justice Rules
of Court,48 the court found that diplomatic representatives are
authorized to waive their countries' immunity for the purposes of

43

See id.

44 Id. at 1294. The Supreme Court's decision in First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco
Para El Comercio Exterior, 462 U.S. 611 (1983), was of central importance to the
Eleventh Circuit's decision to apply a federal rule, rather than look to state law. See id.
In First Nat'l City Bank, the Supreme Court stated that the FSIA "was not intended to
affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign state or instrumentality ...
where state law provides a rule of liability governing private individuals, the FSIA
requires the application of that rule to foreign states in like circumstances." Id. at 622
n. 11. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the effectiveness of an express waiver under §
1605(a)(1) was not a question of liability and was therefore controlled by federal law.
See Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1293.
41 See Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1294. The Eleventh Circuit stated several reasons for
doing so. Id. "First, Congress intended international law to inform the courts in their
reading of the [FSIA's] provisions." Id. "Second, the FSIA's purposes included
'promot[ing] harmonious international relations' and according foreign sovereigns
treatment in U.S. courts that is similar to the treatment the United States would prefer to
receive in foreign courts." Id. (citing Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 489 F.Supp.
526, 528 (E.D. Va. 1980)).
46 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, preamble, 23

U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
47

See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 311 cmt. b (1986).
48 See Rules of Court,

art. 38, 1978 P.C.I.J. 976 (authorizing diplomatic
representatives to bring applications before the Court on behalf of their countries).
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pending judicial proceedings. ' 9 The court pointed to the frustration
of justice and the disruption of foreign relations as reasons to
avoid inquiries into a sovereign's local law."
The court qualified the presumption that an ambassador has
the authority to waive his or her sovereign's immunity. It held
that such authority does not exist when there is "compelling
evidence making it 'obvious"' that the ambassador is manifestly
contradicting his or her sovereign." After examining Ambassador
Teran's course of conduct and the opinions of Ecuadoran legal
authorities, the court found no "obvious" evidence that Teran
lacked authority to waive PNB's sovereign immunity.52 Therefore,
the court concluded that the federal district court erred in failing to
accept jurisdiction over PNB and reversed the decision to dismiss
PNB.53 The court vacated the district court's order remanding the
case to state court and then remanded the case to the district court
for further proceedings. 4
IlL. Background Law
A. A Brief History of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976
In the early nineteenth century, U.S. federal courts adhered to
the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, which shielded foreign
states from all possible suits in American courts. 5 More a
49 See Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1296, 1297.
50 See id. at

1298.

51 Id. at 1299. "Our review of international law supports the conclusion that an
ambassador's statements may so plainly contradict the position of his sovereign that they
do not bind the sovereign." Id.
52 See id at 1300. Plaintiffs submitted the opinions of Ecuadorian legal authorities.
See id
13

See id.

14

See id.

55 See The Schooner Exch. v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Chief
Justice Marshall argued that because all sovereigns possess "equal rights and equal
independence" under international law, a sovereign enters the territory of a friendly
foreign government "in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent
sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication and will
be extended to him." Id. at 136-37. The Schooner Exchange involved a foreign military
vessel, but over 100 years later the Supreme Court expanded the scope of immunity to

include commercial vessels of a foreign state. See Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271
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diplomatic than a judicial concept, 6 this theory of immunity
caused significant hardships for U.S. citizens involved in contracts
with foreign entities and U.S. victims of torts committed by
foreign states. 7 Gradually, the courts became uneasy with the
absolute theory, which not only deprived citizens of legal remedies
against foreign governments, but also served to increase the
commercial advantages of those governments. 8 In 1952, the U.S.
Department of State issued a letter, known as the "Tate Letter,"
which purported to adopt a legal standard known as the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity. 9 Fueled by the inequities of the
absolute theory, the Tate Letter recommended that courts grant
immunity to foreign states only for their public actions and not for
actions arising out of entirely commercial or private acts.6°
Nonetheless, the Tate Letter indicated that the State
Department, an executive branch department, would continue to
issue the recommendations relating to sovereign immunity. 6' This
situation presented a number of problems that were confounded by
the inconsistent application of the policies articulated in the Tate
Letter.62 For example, the Supreme Court in Verlinden B.V. v.
U.S. 562 (1926) (holding that the principles of sovereign immunity are applicable to
commercial ships because those ships advance trade and produce revenue on behalf of
their governments).
56 See Matthew P. McGuire, Note, Direct Effect Jurisdiction in the 90's:
"Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina" and a Broad Interpretation of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 383, 389 (1992).
11 See William R. Dorsey, III, Reflections on the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act
After Twenty Years, 28 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 257, 258 (1997).
58 See Stella Havkin, Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:
The
Relationship Between the Commercial Activity Exception and the Noncommercial Tort
Exception in Light of De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 10 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 455, 459 (1987).
19 See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State to
Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 Dep't St.
Bull. 984-85 (1952), and in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976)
(appendix to opinion of White, J.).
60 See id.
61

See id.

62 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,

6607. The legislative history of the FSIA states that:
From a legal standpoint, if the [U.S. State] Department applies the restrictive
principle in a given case, it is in the awkward position of a political institution
trying to apply a legal standard to litigation already before the courts.
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Central Bank of Nigeria recognized that "foreign nations often
placed diplomatic pressure on the State Department in seeking
immunity. On occasion, political considerations led to suggestions
of immunity in cases where immunity would not have been
available under the restrictive theory." 64 Furthermore, despite the
fact that the State Department rarely declared its rationale for its
decisions, there was no published case law to guide the courts in
challenging a State Department recommendation. 6 Both courts
and litigants dealt with an unpredictable methodology whenever
sovereign immunity was at issue.66

By enacting the FSIA, Congress sought to codify a legal
means of redress for U.S. citizens against foreign states in certain
circumstances. 67 The newly created FSIA shifted power away
from the State Department and vested the judiciary with the
authority to rule on the issue of sovereign immunity.68 Congress
intended the courts to develop a uniform body of law under the
FSIA that, for the first time, established a statutory scheme
defining subject matter and personal jurisdiction over foreign
states.69

Congress envisioned that this body of law would: (1)

eliminate the specter of favoritism that hung over sovereign
immunity decisions; ° (2) bring the United States into conformity
Moreover, it does not have the machinery to take evidence, to hear witnesses, or
to afford appellate review.
Id.
63

461 U.S. 480 (1983).

64

Id. at 488.

65 See Havkin, supra note 58, at 462.
66

See Dorsey, supra note 57, at 260.

67 See Jurisdictionof U.S. Court in Suits Against Foreign States, 1976: Hearings

on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on AdministrativeLaw and Governmental Relations
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94' Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1976) (statement of Monroe
Leigh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State).
68 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6606.
See Goar v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 688 F.2d 417, 420 (5th Cir.1982)
(stating that "Congress chose to treat jurisdiction of actions against foreign sovereigns in
a uniform and comprehensive manner"); see also Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India,
653 F.2d 875, 879 (4th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982) (stating that "[b]oth
the statutory language and the legislative history evince the congressional desire to
achieve uniformity of decisional law in the area of suits against foreign sovereigns").
70 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6611. The
legislative history recognizes that the "broad jurisdiction in the Federal courts should be
69
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with sovereign immunity practices of other nations;" and (3)
provide clear notice to foreign states regarding the application of
the immunity defense in U.S. courts. 72 This notice is particularly
relevant for foreign states that base their own sovereign immunity
doctrines on reciprocity. 73 Reciprocity requires a state to grant
sovereign immunity in its courts to a defendant if the courts of the
defendant foreign state would likewise grant immunity.74
Despite its lofty goals, the FSIA is widely criticized in the
courts and academic commentaries as being poorly drafted and
overly complex.75 One court described the FSIA as a "labyrinth"
that, because of its "bizarre structure and its many deliberately
vague provisions, has during its brief lifetime been a financial
boon for the private bar but a constant bane of the federal
judiciary. 76 As a result, lawyers have had to "rely on their wits"
while U.S. courts attempt to further develop and clarify the law as
it relates to the FSlA. 77

conducive to uniformity in decision, which is desirable since a disparate treatment of
cases involving foreign governments may have adverse foreign relations consequences."
Id.
71 See Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246, 253 (D.D.C. 1985) (maintaining
that "[t]he Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, like every federal statute, should be
interpreted in such a way as to be consistent with the law of nations.").
72 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6609.
73 See MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

§ 20, at 580-84

(1968).
74 See Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 489 F. Supp. 526, 528 (E.D. Va. 1980)

(stating that "a foreign nation is being accorded the same type... of reciprocal immunity
we would like to be accorded in a foreign court"), affd, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir.1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
11 See Victoria A. Carter, Note, God Save the King: Unconstitutional Assertions of
Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign States in U.S. Courts, 82 VA. L. REv. 357, 360
(1996).
76 Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see,
e.g.,Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne De
Navigation, 730 F.2d. 195, 205 (5th Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that the FSIA "presents a peculiarly twisted exercise in
statutory draftsmanship"); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Rep. of Nig., 647
F.2d 300, 307 (2d Cir. 1981) (calling the FSIA a "Gordian knot"), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1148 (1982).
77 Gary B. Sullivan, Implicit Waiver of Sovereign Immunity by Consent to
Arbitration: Territorial-Scope and Procedural Limits, 18 TEx. INT'L L.J. 329, 329
(1983).
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B. Waiver and Power to Waive Underthe FSIA
The FSIA provides that courts have subject matter jurisdiction
over an action only if it falls within an exception to immunity.
The exceptions include express or implicit waivers of immunity,79
suits involving commercial activity, 0 and suits involving personal
injury, death, or damage to or loss of property.8 As to implicit
waivers of immunity, the House Report on the FSIA instructs the
courts to find waivers where foreign states have agreed to
arbitration in another country, agreed that the law of a particular
country should govern a contract, or filed an answer without
raising the sovereign immunity defense. 2 However, when express
waivers are involved, the FSIA is awkwardly silent on which
persons or bodies have authority to waive immunity before U.S.
courts. 3 The legislative history specifies that "since the sovereign
immunity of a political subdivision, agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state derives from the foreign state itself, the foreign state
may waive the immunity of its political subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities. '8 4 Nonetheless, this observation does not
78 See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 484 (1983). In
Verlinden, the Supreme Court held that "if none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity
set forth in the Act applies, the District Court lacks both statutory subject matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction." Id. at 485 n.5. '"The formula of § 1605's
exceptions simultaneously serve three functions in litigation against foreign states: they
grant personal jurisdiction, grant subject matter jurisdiction, and deny immunity." Id. at
488-90.

79 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1988). Of all the exceptions, the "commercial
activity" exception has seen the most litigation in U.S. courts. See Dorsey, supra note
57, at 264. The issue of whether an activity is "commercial" under § 1605(a)(2) has
been a source of debate since the enactment of the FSIA. See Export Group v. Reef
Indus., Inc., 54 F.3d 1466 (9th Cir. 1995). This Note concerns only the express waiver
exception to sovereign immunity.
80 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1999).
81 See § 1605(a)(5).
82 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 18 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,

6617. Though the House Report has not been consistently followed, the courts have
construed the implicit waiver provision very narrowly, typically refusing to find an
implicit waiver where the purported waiver does not fall into one of the three situations
outlined in the legislative history. See Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013,
1017 (2d Cir. 1991).
83 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 18 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6617.
84

Id.
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resolve the specific questions as to who may waive a sovereign's
immunity-or the immunity of that sovereign's agencies or
instrumentalities 85-and what law dictates what constitutes an
effective authoritative waiver of immunity.
Since the enactment of the FSIA, the question of who has the
authority to waive a sovereign's immunity has rarely been litigated
in U.S. courts, so case law remains relatively undeveloped in this
area. While it has been held that a sovereign's counsel can waive
his or her sovereign's immunity, provided that certain
requirements are met,86 a sovereign's counsel is generally unable
to invoke immunity on behalf of the foreign client.87
In the case of ambassadors and other diplomatic agents,
"public officers" by definition," FSIA matters are initially
complicated by issues of international law, foreign policy, and
judicial comity.89 When an ambassador purports to waive his
sovereign's immunity, courts must first decide whether to analyze
the agency relationship according to federal, state, or local foreign
law. 9° Specific problems may arise in cases where the laws of a
85 Cf. The State Immunity Act, § 2(7), c.33, (1978) (U.K.). Note:

The head of a state's diplomatic mission in the United Kingdom, or the person
for the time being performing his functions, shall be deemed to have authority
to submit on behalf of the State in respect of any proceedings; and any person
who has entered into a contract on behalf of and with the authority of a State
shall be deemed to have authority to submit on its behalf in respect of
proceedings arising out the contract.
Id.
86 See Hercaire Int'l Inc. v. Argentina, 821 F.2d 559, 561 (11 th Cir. 1987) (treating

statement included an answer and counterclaim as an "express waiver") (emphasis
added); see also Sotheby's, Inc. v. Garcia, 802 F. Supp. 1058, 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(finding that a memorandum of law and affirmation of counsel expressly waived
Republic of the Philippines' sovereign immunity). In Maritime Ventures Int'l, Inc. v.
Caribbean Trading & Fidelity, Ltd., 722 F.Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), "the court stated
that Congress... intended to restrict corporations and individuals more stringently from
invoking the protective veil of sovereign immunity than it did to limit their ability to
waive immunity on behalf of the government for whom they served as a private agent."
Id. at 1038.
87 See United States of Mexico v. Rask, 118 Cal. App. 21 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1931) (emphasis added).
88 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
89

79 (6th ed. 1990).

See Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279 (11 th

Cir. 1999).
90 See id; First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. The Gov't of Antigua & Barbuda-
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foreign country explicitly prevent any waiver of sovereign
immunity by the foreign government, or where those laws assign
waiver authority to a specified few. 9' If the court decides to
exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the issue, it must then
create and apply a rule that governs the scope of an ambassador's
authority without outwardly disrespecting the sovereign's right to
regulate its own affairs. 92
In First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Government of Antigua &
Barbuda,93 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals began developing
an approach to the unique concerns related to ambassadorial
waivers of immunity under the FSIA. First Fidelity involved an
ambassador to the United Nations from Antigua & Barbuda who
borrowed $250,000 from a commercial lender-ostensibly for
the purpose of renovating his country's permanent mission in New
York City. 94 The ambassador signed the loan agreement with First
Fidelity in his capacity as ambassador to the United Nations but
thereafter used the money for personal purposes. 9 After the
ambassador ceased repayment on the loan, plaintiff initiated suit
against the single Government of Antigua & Barbuda. 96 Nine
months after a default judgment was entered in favor of the
plaintiff, the ambassador and the bank entered into a settlement
agreement in which the ambassador, acting on behalf of the
government, waived the defense of sovereign immunity. 9 The
ambassador defaulted on the settlement agreement which, in turn,
prompted the bank to seek attachment of the accounts of the
government. 9'
In defending against the attachment, the
government moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter
Permanent Mission, 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989).
91 See George Kahale, Immunity and Jurisdiction: Toward a Uniform Body of Law
in Actions Against ForeignStates, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 231-232 (1979).
92 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 710 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing the implications of the act of state doctrine to the
actions of foreign government officials).
93 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989).
14 See id. at 191-192.
95 See id. at 197 (Newman, J., dissenting).
96 See id. at 194.
97 See id at 191. The agreement was also signed by an individual claiming to be
the attorney for the Government of Antigua & Barbuda. See id.
98 See id.
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jurisdiction under the FSIA.99 The government argued that it was
not bound by the ambassador's acts because they were beyond the
scope of his authority.'0° The district court denied the motion and
the government appealed. 01
On appeal, the issue was whether the ambassador possessed
the requisite authority to borrow money and to waive sovereign
immunity on behalf of his government. 0 2 The bank argued that
the ambassador possessed either actual or apparent authority to
bind his government to the loan agreement and the waiver,
because of his high diplomatic standing.' 3 The court rejected this
broad view of authority and instead discussed the powers of
diplomatic officials as an issue of agency.' 4 The court concluded
that it would apply the agency law of New York to the
government-ambassador relationship.' 5
The court cited the
Supreme Court in First National City Bank v. Banco Para El
Comercio Exteriorde Cuba ("Bancec") for the proposition that the
FSIA does not affect the substantive law determining the liability
of a foreign state.' 6 The court held that the ambassador's title
alone was not sufficient to bind the government. Rather, his
position was an element to be weighed in determining whether the
bank had been reasonable in relying on the authority under New
York agency law.'0 7
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See id.

102 See id at 190-91.
103 See id.
104 See id. at 192-94.

105 See id. at 193. The court held that "[t]he facts of a given case must be examined,
and the agency law of developed states, here our own, provides the proper framework for
the examination." Id
'06 See id at 194 n.3 (citing First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio
Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 620-621 (1983)).
107 See id at 194. In his dissent, Judge Newman was primarily concerned with the
ramifications of the majority's choice of law determination. Id. at 197 (Newman, J.,
dissenting). Judge Newman stated that:

[tihough foreign states, if amenable to suit in this country, may, in most
circumstances, be obliged to accept state substantive law that normally applies
to such matters as contracts and creditors' rights, they are entitled to expect that
this country will have a uniform body of federal law that determines those
issues of agency law that implicate relationships between a foreign government
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IV. Significance of the Case
At the outset of Aquamar, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged
that "novel issues" relating to the waiver provisions of the FSIA
had been raised by the appeal. °8
Indeed, the jurisprudential
landscape behind the express waiver provision-particularly
ambassadorial powers under that provision-is sparsely populated.
A. The Decision Whether to Apply Federalor State "Choice
of Law" Rules
In Aquamar, the federal district court and then the Eleventh
Circuit sought to determine whether Edgar Teran, as ambassador
for the Republic of Ecuador, could waive the sovereign immunity
of an Ecuadoran government agency. 09 This question is governed
by the FSIA, but neither the language of the FSIA nor its
legislative history define with certainty "whether federal or state
law controls questions relating to the authority of a person who
purports to waive the immunity of a foreign sovereign under the
FSIA."' 0 Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit had to determine
whether to apply state or federal law under the FSIA."1
The Eleventh Circuit turned to the Supreme Court's ruling in
FirstNational City Bank v. Banco ParaEl Comercio Exterior"2 in
which the Court held that "where state law provides a rule of
liability governing private individuals, the FSIA requires the
application of that rule to foreign states in like circumstances.""' 3
The Eleventh Circuit held that federal law controlled because the
effectiveness of an express waiver under the FSIA was not a
and its ambassador accredited within this country.
Id. Additionally, Judge Newman observed that under the majority's view, New York
common law required that the bank exercise a duty of inquiry to the principal foreign
state. See id. He argued that foreign states would not appreciate such an inquiry from a
U.S. vendor. See id
108 Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1282
(11th Cir. 1999). The court noted that "this action [ ] made its way through the courts of
three jurisdictions: the United States, the State of Florida, and the Republic of Ecuador."
Id.
109 See id. at 1293.
110 Id.
I"'See id.
112

462 U.S. 611 (1983).

113

Id. at 622 n. 11.
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question of liability." 4 This argument comports logically with the
Supreme Court's ruling in First National and with the Second
Circuit's application of state law in First Fidelity."5 In First
Fidelity, the Second Circuit determined whether Antigua &
Barbuda, as a principal, was liable for the actions of the
ambassador, its agent." 6 In Aquamar, amenability to the lawsuit,
rather than liability in the lawsuit, was the factual inquiry." 7
Had the Eleventh Circuit ruled that state law was controlling in
this matter, an element of legal unpredictability, associated with
the varying substantive laws of the fifty states, would ensure
difficult and confused relations between foreign sovereigns and
the U.S. judiciary."' By choosing federal law, the court enables
foreign consulates and their ambassadors to rely on a "uniform"
body of jurisprudence, which satisfies the essential goal of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. " 9 Indeed, commentators have
argued that the United States as a whole has a "federal interest" in
the application of a uniform set of choice of law rules that reflect
U.S. understanding of international jurisdiction."0 By choosing to
apply federal choice-of-law rules to the express waiver issue, the
Eleventh Circuit has bolstered the policies underlying the FSIA
itself and planted a signpost for other circuits faced with like
I" See Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1293-94. The court noted that "[a] section 1605(a)(1)
waiver inquiry... does not require the court to determine the extent or existence of the
sovereign's liability; the court need only decide the preliminary question of whether the
sovereign is amenable to suit." Id. at 1294 n.36. This statement is consistent with other
rulings on the issue of whether state or federal law applies to non-liability FSIA
questions. See, e.g., Hercaire Int'l, Inc. v. Argentina, 821 F.2d 559, 563-65 (11th Cir.
1987) (holding that a federal standard applies to the determination of the scope of an
express waiver); Skeen v. Federative Republic of Brazil, 566 F.Supp. 1414, 1417
(D.D.C. 1983) (holding that "as a general rule, only the purely federal question of
sovereign immunity is to be decided on the basis of federal law"). But see Lu v. P.R.C.,
892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1058 (1990) (applying state
common law in suit between widow of Taiwanese historian and Republic of China for
wrongful death and damages).
"5 See First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. The Gov't of Antigua & Barbuda-Permanent
Mission, 877 F.2d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 1989); see also supra notes 92-106 and
accompanying text.
116 See First Fidelity, 887 F.2d at 192.
"7
11
"9
120

See Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1294.
See BoRN, supra note 92, at 622.
Id. at 683.
Id.

614

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 25

circumstances.
B. Whether Ambassador Teran had the Authority To Waive
PNB's Immunity Under the FSIA
The Eleventh Circuit applied a federal standard to analyze
Ambassador Teran's authority to waive PNB's immunity.'2 ' First,
the court turned to international law to ascertain the meaning of
the FSIA waiver provision. 22 In part, the decision was premised
on the district court's assumption that foreign sovereigns might be
encouraged to apply their own laws to ambassadorial
representations if decisions in these matters were to be based
solely on U.S. law.22
The court focused its examination of
international law on a number of sources that suggest "a
sovereign's chief diplomatic representative to a foreign nation
possesses an extraordinary role and powers.' ' 2 4 Since Aquamar is
the first case to give significant treatment to the U.S. interpretation
of ambassadorial powers to waive immunity, the court drew an
analogy to numerous U.S. decisions that presume ambassadors
have authority to represent their foreign states in legal
proceedings.' 21 On this basis, the Eleventh Circuit overtly
extended that presumption of authority to include the power of an
ambassador to waive sovereign immunity.' 26 Next, the court set
forth the rule that "under the FSIA, courts should assume that an
ambassador possesses the authority to appear before them and
waive sovereign immunity absent compelling evidence making it
121

See Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1289.

122

See id at 1294; see also supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (explaining

the court's reason for applying international law).
123 See Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 294 n.39. Deference to international law necessarily
symbolizes deference to the sovereignty and particular interests of foreign states;
however, some foreign countries may not choose to characterize the authority of
American ambassadors according to an international legal standard, if such a standard
exists. For example, Country X may not allow U.S. diplomats to perform certain tasks in
X's judicial system.
124 Id. at 1295.
"I See id at 1297 (citing nine cases involving, to a lesser extent, the scope of
authority of foreign ambassadors involved in U.S. legal proceedings).
126 See id Given their broadest possible interpretation, the cases cited by the court
still fail to stand for the proposition offered by the Eleventh Circuit in this particular
case-that an ambassador is presumed to have the ability to effectuate a waiver of
sovereign immunity. See id.
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'obvious' that he or she does not.' ' 27
Once more, turning to the Second Circuit's decision in First
Fidelity for comparison, the court concluded that, unlike the
ambassador in First Fidelity,12 Ambassador Teran acted with the
requisite authority of his government and therefore effectuated a
proper waiver of PNB's sovereign immunity. 29 The Eleventh
Circuit, however, did not offer further explanation of what
constitutes 'compelling evidence' for the purposes of establishing
that an ambassador does not have the authority to waive his or her
sovereign's immunity. 3 ° Instead, the court depended on the
affidavit of Ecuadoran president Duran Ballen to support its
conclusion that Ambassador Teran had the authority to waive
PNB's immunity. 3' In light of the court's refusal to inquire into
Ecuadoran law,3 2 this reliance on the affidavit of a president has
the subtle implication of giving far too much weight to the
executive branch of a foreign country.
The court did note that the FSIA does not prohibit a foreign
state from waiving its immunity for strategic advantage."'
However, the Eleventh Circuit failed to recognize that this gives
rise to potential abuse of the waiver provision. A foreign
government might waive its immunity intending to win a forum
non conveniens motion, with the knowledge that the case might

127

Id. at 1299. The court found one example of such compelling evidence in its

"review of international law support[ing] the conclusion that an ambassador's statements
may so plainly contradict the position of his sovereign that they do not bind the
sovereign." Id.
"2I See First Fidelity Bank N.A. v. The Gov't of Antigua & Barbuda-Permanent
Mission, 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989).
129 See Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1289.

132

See id.
See id. at 1300.
See id at 1298.

133

See id. at 1293. The court stated that:

130
131

Nothing in the FSIA prohibits a foreign sovereign from effecting a waiver of
immunity for strategic purposes. The courts need not approve the reasons
underlying a foreign state's waiver of its immunity; indeed, to second-guess
motivations and litigation strategy might signal a disrespect for a sovereign's
autonomy that is at odds with the policies underlying the FSIA.

616

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 25

then be remanded to its own local courts.14 In the Aquamar case,
the Ecuadoran courts refused to accept the case after it was
remanded to their courts by the federal district judge, leaving the
matter "in an odd limbo."' 35 This fact calls into question the
veracity of Teran's statement that environmental affairs should be
decided in Ecuador and with it President Ballen's subsequent
ratification. The liability of PNB-an arm of the Ecuadoran
government-to the defendants certainly appears as a likely
motivation. 136
In response, the Eleventh Circuit stated that an investigation
into a foreign ambassador's authority to perform diplomatic tasks
contravenes the "separation of powers" principle-"[t]he question
who represents and acts for a foreign sovereign or nation in its
relations with the United States is determined, not by the judicial
department, but exclusively by the political branch of the
government."''

134 See BORN, supra note 92, at 623. A sovereign might escape liability completely

if on remand to its own courts, those courts refuse to hear a case. See id
115 Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1288.
136 The Ecuadoran government has previously found itself in awkward legal
situations. See Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In Aquinda,
the Republic of Ecuador-and its entity, PetroEcuador-fought for nearly three years to
avoid liability to Texaco, Inc. as a third-party defendant by arguing for dismissal on the
grounds of "international comity." Id. at 51. After the district court finally dismissed the
complaint against the Republic, the government made a motion to intervene in the
litigation--citing an electoral change as the reason for wanting to assist the plaintiffs.
See id. In denying the motion to intervene, the court commented that "[flinality in
litigation and the orderly administration of justice would be rendered a mockery and a
sham if electoral changes and accompanying shifts in viewpoint could of themselves
justify renunciations of formal positions previously taken with the Court." Id.
137 Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1298 (quoting Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Co. v.
American Can Co., 258 F. 363, 368 (2d Cir. 1919)). The court's reliance on this case is
dubious. The world is far more globally connected than it was in 1919, and globalization
has caused a tremendous influx of litigation involving foreign clients into the U.S. court
system. See BORN, supra note 92, at 4. Therefore, the judiciary has been charged with
greater responsibilities in the area of foreign relations. See id at 11. In part, this trend
was acknowledged by the enactment of the FSIA in 1976, which transferred the power to
decide issues of sovereign immunity from the executive to the judicial branch. See supra
notes 55-66 and accompanying text.

20001

AMBASSADORS' RIGHTS UNDER THE

FSIA

617

C. Why not Fully Examine EcuadoranLaw to Ascertain
Whether Ambassador Teran had Authority to Waive PNB 's
Immunity?
The federal district court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals diverged sharply on the issue of which law-U.S. or
Ecuadoran-should apply to Ambassador Teran's purported
waiver of PNB's immunity."' The district court attempted to
"become informed of the relevant provisions of Ecuadoran law [so
as to] determine precisely what [was] required for an effective
waiver of sovereign

immunity under

that law.' 3 9

After

recognizing its "diligent effort," the Eleventh Circuit went on to
reject the district court's foray into Ecuadoran law. 40 The court
reasoned that requiring courts to analyze foreign law would
conflict with the policies of the FSIA and its waiver provision,
cause "lengthy [and] unpredictable" litigation, 4' and increase the
number of "potentially intrusive and resented inquiries of foreign
governments."' 4' These fears are certainly rational as judges and
lawyers practicing in the United States cannot and should not be
expected to know the laws of a foreign country.143 Furthermore, it
is possible that a party opposed to the presence of a foreign
sovereign might be able to convince a court to "deny it the
opportunity to appear and defend on the ground that it is
prohibited from doing so under its own law."'"
What if, under the laws of a certain country, an ambassador is
explicitly barred from waiving sovereign immunity? How could a
court follow the Eleventh Circuit's "bright line" rule-that
dismisses foreign law-without infringing on that country's
sovereign right to enact its own controlling legislation? Keep in
138 See Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1293.
139 Id.
140

Id.

141 Id. at

1298.
Id. (quoting First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Gov't. of Antigua & BarbudaPermanent Mission, 877 F.2d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., dissenting)).
143 Joseph Story observed that it would "annihilate the sovereignty and equality" of
states if they were compelled to apply foreign law. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
142

CONFLICr OF LAws
144

§ 32 (2d ed. 1841).

George Kahale III, State Loan Transactions: Foreign Law Restrictions on

Waivers of Immunity and Submissions to Jurisdiction, 37 Bus. LAW 1549, 1561 n.70
(1982).
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mind that U.S. governmental power is, unlike that in many other
nations, because it is divided "among ...a federal authority and
its constituent territorial units.' ' 145 A better rule might recognize
this difference, and account for a foreign government's structure
by examining more closely those instances in which an
ambassador's actions are entirely circumscribed by his or her local
law. 146
V. Conclusion
With the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Aquamar S.A. v. Del
Monte Fresh Produce S.A., the extent of ambassadorial powers
under the express waiver provision of the FSIA has been given
initial treatment and definition. 147 Perhaps more significantly, the
court used a hybrid of federal and international law to reach its
conclusion and, in so doing, sided strongly against the application
of foreign law. 4 The Eleventh Circuit's analysis displayed at
least some ignorance of those situations in which a foreign
country's legislation expressly prohibits their ambassadors from
waiving sovereign immunity. Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit's
analysis has compromised the foreign policy of these sovereign
states.14
ADAM F. HULBIG

"45Sandra Engle, Note, Choosing Law for Attributing Liability Under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act: A Proposalfor Uniformity, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1060,
1096 (1992).
146 "[Ilt would be wholly incompatible with the equality and exclusiveness of the
sovereignty of all nations, that any one nation should be at liberty to regulate either
persons or things not within its own territory." STORY, supra note 143, § 20.
147 See supra notes 108-46 and accompanying text.
148

See supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.

141 Interestingly,

the Eleventh Circuit gives no indication that an ambassador would
be required to produce the written or oral approval of his or her government. In this
case, it just so happened that the President of Ecuador ratified the ambassador's conduct.
See Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., 179 F.3d 1279, 1300 (11th Cir.
1999). Under the Aquamar decision, it is conceivable that an ambassador could operate
contrary to the interests of his or her government-and according to those of a particular
political faction-while subsequently passing undetected through the lens of the court.

